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The 4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model Development to 
Characterize Accidents in Maritime Transportation System 
 
(海上輸送システムにおける海難分析のための MOP モデル開発) 
 
Summary 
 
The number of ships has increased, on average, more than 1.5% per year. At the end 
of 2016, the number of ships around the world was 91,000 [UNCTAD, 2017]. The 
investigation institutions of European Union (EU) Member states form the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to keep track of all marine casualties and incidents 
every year. In order to do this, EMSA created the European Marine Casualty 
Information Platform (EMCIP) and now publishes an annual report of its findings. 
In 2014, EMSA received 3,025 accident and incident reports (reported occurrences) 
that involved 3,399 ships [EMSA, 2015]. This number was an increase from 2,767 
reports in 2013, and the increase number is believed to be caused by improvements 
in reporting.  
 
In Japan, in 2014, there were 688 accidents, and in 2015, 793 accident investigations 
were launched [JTSB, 2016]. The number of investigation reports increased just as 
it did at EMSA. Nowadays, accident investigation boards in each country have 
realized importance of collecting accident reports and are making improvements in 
collection. In line with these efforts to gather accident reports, analyzes is also being 
better developed. In this current research, the author develops a new model, the 4M 
Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model, to characterize the various accidents. The 
characteristics found by this model are based on a list of causative factors and 
causative chains for each country, ship type, accident type, etc. depending on the 
needs of the inquiry. 
 
MOP Model is developed by combining the Septigon model (society and culture, 
physical environment, practice, technology, individual, group, and organizational 
environment network) created by Grech et al. [Grech, Horberry, Koester, 2008] and 
the IM model proposed by Furusho [Furusho, 2013, 2000]. The IM model consists 
of 4M factors (man, machine, media, and management) that are connected by the 
individual element (I) as the core of the system. The MOP model is drawn as a three-
dimensional relationship that appears as a three-sided inverted pyramid, where each 
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corner of the pyramid represents one 4M factor. Each corner (factor) is connected to 
and affects the other factors. 
 
The man factor should always be at the bottom of the inverted pyramid because it is 
the intrinsic factor that significantly affects all other factors. Because the model is 
drawn three-dimensionally as a three-sided inverted pyramid, it has four corners 
representing the 4M factors, and six edges representing interaction between the two 
factors that are connected by the edges. The edges, which are called line relations, 
show that the system is the result of interactions among the 4M factors. Thus, to 
obtain a safe system, all corners and edges should be reliable and balanced. 
 
The corners and edges in the model are representatives of stakeholders of Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS) that contain not only the construction of the ship, but 
also many stakeholders involved. This system called as Socio-Technical 
Environment (STE). 
This dissertation provides a new model, MOP model, is developed to characterize 
several accidents from the chain of failure. The final outcome of this model is 
causative chains of collisions.  
 
The aims of this study are to find characteristics of accidents using data from Japan, 
United States (US), Australia, and United Kingdom (UK) and expand 4M (Man, 
Machine, Media, Management) concept into 4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model 
that characterizes accidents as a chain of failures. This study re-analyzes accident 
investigation reports that are published by Maritime Transportation Safety Agencies 
(MTSAs) from each country in 2008-2013. 
 
This dissertation has 7 chapters and is arranged as explained below. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides background why author carries out this research in detail, 
objectives, methodology and a brief explanation how the dissertation is made. The 
chapter construction is also provided in this chapter to make reader easier 
understanding what is inside this book. 
 
Chapter 2 – Maritime Transportation System and Accidents 
This chapter presents a literature review about MTS and maritime accidents. 
Definition of several terms that are related to this study is also provided here to make 
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reader easier distinguish the different terms. Three main models of accidents are 
provided here including the definition of accident types. 
 
Chapter 3 – 4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model 
This chapter outlines the original aspects of this research, the MOP model. Started 
from explanation how the MOP model is made up, the definition of the elements, 
the steps, to apply this model, to characterize accidents are also defined, and the 
development of the model year by year. 
 
Chapter 4 – Accident in Several Countries Analyzed by MOP model 
This chapter applies the MOP model to collision accidents in Japan, Australia, UK, 
and US. The detail step of the MOP model is explained here from the causative 
analysis until line relation analysis. It provides the outcome from each step of MOP 
model, causative factor and causative chain lists. However, the detail step how the 
list of causative factors found is written in Appendix B. The comparison results from 
corner analysis are provided in occurrence ratio so then the comparison is not done 
only by the number of failures for each causative factor but also considered the total 
number of all failures occurred in each 4M factor in the country. From here, reader 
can easily see the characteristic of the collision in a country. 
 
Chapter 5 – Specific Topics 
The previous chapter applies the MOP model to general purpose of characterizing 
the accidents. This chapter presents a deeper analysis utilizing MOP model for 
specific cases of time occurrence classification and improper look-out. The data is 
collision in Japan. The corner analysis and line relation analysis here are modified 
based on the need. The failures listed in causative factor list are divided based on 
time occurrences, day, night, and twilight. The more detail improper lookout 
occurred in Japan are also broken down in this chapter. The causative factors that 
are causing and caused by improper lookout are also showed here. 
 
Chapter 6 - Summary of the Analysis and Discussion 
It summarizes the analysis and discussion gotten from result in chapter 4 and chapter 
5. This chapter provide the discussion of the most common causative factors that 
has outstanding number in each M factor as well as its causing factors. In total, there 
should be 4 point discussions because each point represents the most outstanding 
number of failures in each M factor. However, in man factor, there are two causative 
factors that have highest number of failures, thus there are 5 points discussed here. 
They are Careless from seaman in maintaining proper lookout (M101-02), Careless 
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from seaman in monitoring/identifying any accident risk (M101-03), Equipment 
failure: AIS/ radar could not show information (M201-01), Busy traffic (M301-01), 
Poor management from onshore in identifying/ monitoring/ communicating any risk 
accident (M405-01). 
 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
It concludes all the analysis and discussion with an explanation of the reliability of 
the MOP model for use in characterizing maritime accidents. The conclusion that is 
gotten are: 
1. The dominant factor leading to collision is man factor (M1) 
In general man factor is still act as the main CF of accident, it is supported by the 
result of analyzed accident report shown the biggest number of failure in MOP 
model`s CA is on man factor. And the most significant factors from man factor are 
“Careless seaman in maintaining proper lookout” and “Careless seaman in 
monitoring/identifying any accident risk”, both CF are classified as “Careless 
Seaman”. In Machine factor, the most common CF is “Equipment failure: AIS/radar 
could not show information”, in Media factor is “Busy Traffic”, while in 
Management factor, “Poor management from onshore in identifying/ monitoring/ 
communicating any accident risk”. 
2. MOP model is one of choice to analyze accident because of its flexibility 
As the simple approach, this model can be utilized by organization/company to get 
the tendency how their accident occurred and modified based on their needs. This 
flexibility will be the benefit because the researcher can utilize this method started 
by generating the data needed.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The number of ships, oil tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo, container ships, and 
others, have been increasing steadily around the world since 2011. The number of 
ships has increased, on average, more than 1.5% per year. At the end of 2016, the 
number of ships around the world was 91,000 [1]. The investigation institutions of 
European Union (EU) Member states form the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) to keep track of all marine casualties and incidents every year. In order to 
do this, EMSA created the European Marine Casualty Information Platform 
(EMCIP) and now publishes an annual report of its findings. In 2014, EMSA 
received 3,025 accident and incident reports (reported occurrences) that involved 
3,399 ships [2]. This number was an increase from 2,767 reports in 2013, and the 
increase number is believed to be caused by improvements in reporting.  
In Japan, in 2014, there were 688 accidents, and in 2015, 793 accident investigations 
were launched [3]. The number of investigation reports increased just as it did at 
EMSA. Nowadays, accident investigation boards in each country have realized 
importance of collecting accident reports and are making improvements in 
collection. In line with these efforts to gather accident reports, analyzes is also being 
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better developed. In this current research, the author develops a new model, the 4M 
Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model, to characterize the various accidents. The 
characteristics found by this model are based on a list of causative factors and 
causative chains for each country, ship type, accident type, etc. depending on the 
needs of the inquiry. 
MOP Model is developed by combining the Septigon model (society and culture, 
physical environment, practice, technology, individual, group, and organizational 
environment network) created by Grech et al. [4] and the IM model proposed by 
Furusho [5] [6]. The IM model consists of 4M factors (man, machine, media, and 
management) that are connected by the individual element (I) as the core of the 
system. The MOP model is drawn as a three-dimensional relationship that appears 
as a three-sided inverted pyramid, where each corner of the pyramid represents one 
4M factor. Each corner (factor) is connected to and affects the other factors. The 
man factor should always be at the bottom of the inverted pyramid because it is the 
intrinsic factor that significantly affects all other factors. Because the model is drawn 
three-dimensionally as a three-sided inverted pyramid, it has four corners 
representing the 4M factors, and six edges representing interaction between the two 
factors that are connected by the edges. The edges, which are called line relations, 
show that the system is the result of interactions among the 4M factors. Thus, to 
obtain a safe system, all corners and edges should be reliable and balanced. 
The corners and edges in the model are representatives of stakeholders of Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS) that contain not only the construction of the ship, but 
also many stakeholders involved. This system called as Socio-Technical 
Environment (STE).  
1.2 Objectives 
- To find characteristics of accidents using data from Japan, United States 
(US), Australia, and United Kingdom (UK). 
- Expand 4M (Man, Machine, Media, Management) concept into 4M 
Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model that characterizes accidents as a chain 
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of failures 
1.3 Methodology 
These are the step conducting this work: 
- Literature study and finding data (investigation reports) 
- Listing all the causative factors of ship accidents from the accident reports 
- Categorize the list into 4 M Factors 
- Find the causative chain that connect the causative factors 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation has 7 chapters and is arranged as explained below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides background why author carries out this research, objectives, 
methodology and a brief explanation how the dissertation is made. The chapter 
construction is also provided in this chapter to make reader easier understanding 
what is inside this book. 
Chapter 2 – Maritime Transportation System and Accidents 
This chapter presents a literature review about MTS and maritime accidents. There 
will be definition of several terms that are related to this study to make reader easier 
distinguish the different terms. Three main models of accidents are provided here 
including the definition of accident types. 
Chapter 3 – 4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) Model 
This chapter outlines the original aspects of this research, the MOP model. Started 
from explanation how the MOP model is made up, the definition of the elements, 
the steps, to apply this model, to characterize accidents are also defined, and the 
4 
 
development of the model year by year. 
Chapter 4 – Accident in Several Countries Analyzed by MOP model 
This chapter applies the MOP model to collision accidents in Japan, Australia, UK, 
and US. The detail step of the MOP model is explained here from the causative 
analysis until line relation analysis. 
Chapter 5 – Specific Topics 
The previous chapter applies the MOP model to general purpose of characterizing 
the accidents. This chapter presents a deeper analysis utilizing MOP model for 
specific cases of time occurrence classification and improper look-out. The data is 
collision in Japan. 
Chapter 6 - Summary of the Analysis and Discussion 
This chapter summarizes the analysis from chapter 4 and 5 and discusses the result 
by taking the relation among them.  
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
This last chapter concludes with an explanation of the reliability of the MOP model 
for use in characterizing maritime accidents. 
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Fig. 1.1 Dissertation structure 
 
6 
 
  
7 
 
 
Chapter 2  
Maritime Transportation System 
(MTS) and Accidents 
2.1 Term Definitions 
There are several terms that are often used in literatures related to this study. The 
author defines those terms appropriate to this study. Table 2.1 provides the terms 
and definitions.  
When there is an accident, it is important to analyze the accident to find the main 
cause. While there are many different kinds of accidents, we can collect the main 
causes and find the most common main causes among those accidents. If we can 
isolate the most common causal factors, this will help in reducing accidents. 
Kristiansen describes a number of accident analysis models, and has looked at 
various ways of approaching accident analysis [7]. He says that the basis of safety 
concerns should be firm knowledge about why accidents happen. We need to know 
what safe operation entails. A key source of such knowledge can be learned from 
accidents, incidents and near-accidents/ non-conformance. We make a distinction 
between the following events: 
- An accident is an event that leads to damage, environmental consequences, 
with injuries or fatalities and economic loss. 
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- An incident is an event that is controlled before it leads to an accident. 
- Non-conformance is a deviation from accepted technical or operational 
tolerances. 
Table 2.1 Terms and Definitions 
Terms Definitions 
Peril something that causes or may cause injury, loss, or destruction  
Danger an instance or cause of peril; menace  
Harm physical or mental injury  
Error a deviation from accuracy or correctness 
Hazard - possible events or conditions that may result in severity, i.e. cause significant 
harm [7] 
- potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment [8] 
Risk - an evaluation of hazards in terms of severity and probability [7] 
- a combination of frequency and the severity of consequence [8] 
Consequence the outcome of an accident [8] 
Safety the degree of freedom from danger and harm. Safety is achieved by doing things 
right the first time and every time [7] 
Reliability the ability of a system or component to perform certain defined functions [7] 
Safety 
Management 
keeping an operation safe through systematic and safety-minded organization and 
management of both human and physical resources [7] 
System Safety the discipline that utilizes system engineering and management techniques to make 
systems safe throughout their life-cycle [7] 
Risk Analysis the process of calculating the risk for the identified hazards [7] 
Risk Assessment the process of using the results obtained in the risk analysis to improve the safety 
of a system through risk reduction [7] 
Risk Management a process to manage the risk in the system by considering new safety measures (or 
risk control measures) and assessing to what degree current risk management and 
regulations mitigate the system hazards [7] 
Formal Safety 
Assessment 
(FSA) 
a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety, 
including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using 
risk analysis and cost benefit assessment [8] 
Human Error a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an individual or a 
group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or undesirable results [8] 
Human 
Reliability 
the probability that a person:  
correctly performs some system-required activity in a required time period, 
performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the system [8] 
Human Factors/ 
Ergonomics 
study concerned with optimizing the relationship between people and their 
activities, by the systematic application of human sciences, integrated within the 
framework of system engineering, synonymous with ergonomics [9]) 
Human Element a term synonymous with human factors (widely used in Asia) or ergonomics 
(widely used in Europe), set by IMO [8] 
Human Sciences Study of the structure and nature of human beings, their capabilities and limitations, 
and their behaviors both singly and in groups [9] 
Those three events can also be determined by the different degrees of seriousness 
with respect to consequences as follows: 
- Accident is an undesirable event that results in damage to humans, asset 
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and/or the environment. 
- Incident is an undesirable event that are detected, brought under control or 
neutralized before they result in accidental outcomes 
- Non-conformance is a situation where the operation is outside certain 
criteria that define what is acceptable. 
2.2 Maritime Transportation System (MTS) 
Before analyzing maritime accidents, we have to know about the Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS). According to Kristiansen, the MTS includes actors, 
effects and deviations [7]. It should be pointed out that the performance, or rather 
lack of performance from the actors, will be reflected in different types of deviations 
or non-conformities and result in some effects. While Rothblum says that the MTS 
is a people system [10]. In this system people interact with technology, the 
environment, and organizational factors as shown in Fig. 2.1. 
Fig. 2.1 Maritime Transportation System (revised [10]) 
Table 2.2 Maritime systems effects - people 
 Effects from system Effects on people 
Technology 
(Machine) 
- Anthropometry 
- Equipment layout 
- Information display 
- Maintenance 
- Reach, strength, agility 
- Perception & 
comprehension 
- Decision-making 
- Safety and performance 
Environment 
(Media) 
- Temperature, noise 
- Sea state, vibration 
- Regulations 
- Economics 
- Physical and mental 
performance 
- Fatigue 
- Risk-taking 
Organization 
(Management) 
- Work schedules 
- Crew complements 
- Training 
- Communication 
- Safety culture 
- Fatigue 
- Knowledge and skills 
- Work practices 
- Teamwork 
- Risk-taking 
People
Organization
EnvironmentTechnology
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First, the core of the system is people. In the MTS, this includes the ship’s crew, 
pilots, dock workers, Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators, and others. The 
performance of these people depends on many traits, both innate and learned. The 
components of people are made up of their knowledge, skills, abilities, memories, 
motivations, and alertness. The interaction between people and other factors is 
shown in Table 2.2. 
Since all the elements connect and affect each other, the system cannot be broken 
down into separate components. Mullai and Paulson describe the MTS as a very 
complex and large-scale socio-technical environment (STE) system comprising 
human and man-made entities that interact with each other and operate in a physical 
environment [11]. In the STE system, the system can be analyzed as a combination 
of technology (the vessel, engine, equipment, instruments, etc.) and a social system 
(the crew, their culture, norms, habits, customs, practices, etc.) [4]. The STE system 
analysis of maritime accidents looks at system error rather than organizational or 
human error.  
As a very complex and large-scale STE, the combination of social – technical 
environment occurs frequently. In terms of maritime transportation, ships that is the 
main object for transporting the goods is supported by various stakeholders that 
guarantee the process of transferring goods from one place to another goes well. 
These stakeholders is create as the function of it special aim and take part to 
complete each other. For example, to make an equal the level of playing field in 
world`s shipping requirements, International Maritime Organization (IMO) was 
created and established the policy that concern to shipping activities. To assist the 
seafarers to enter and leave the seaport, the pilotage was born. Classification society 
also initiated to assure that the ships that used as main transportation tools is safely 
functioned. There are possibilities that another maritime stakeholder will establish 
in order to make shipping activities and other maritime-related transportation 
become safer. 
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2.3 Number of operated ship 
World`s ships number is increasing year by year, shown in Fig. 2.1. In 2011, the 
number of ships is recorded at 83,283 units, while in 2016, the number of ships that 
going in the ocean is 90,917 ships [1]. This fact shows that sea trading is still a 
favorable choice to transport goods from a country to another. Besides, it indicates 
the development of MTS. Ships is also constructed with the latest technology to 
make it as a tool that can assure the high level of safety, with as much as it can in 
term of ships capacity, and harmless for environment.  
 
Fig. 2.2 The Number of Ships in the World in 2011-2016 
In the website, UNCTAD break down all the ships registered in each country. Fig. 
2.3 below show the number of ship in Japan, United Kingdom (UK), United States 
(US), and Australia that are also analyzed in this study. 
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Fig. 2.3 The number of ships in Indonesia, Japan, US, UK, Canada, Australia in 2011-
2016 
From Fig. 2.2, it shows that only ships in Canada is decreased, meanwhile the other 
are increased.  
 
Fig. 2.4 The total amount of gross tonnage in Indonesia, Japan, US, UK, Canada, 
Australia in 2011-2016 
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Fig. 2.5 The total amount of dead weight in Indonesia, Japan, US, UK, Canada, 
Australia in 2011-2016 
Fig. 2.3-2.4 shows the total gross tonnage and dead weight. UK, Japan, and 
Indonesian ships are increased, but US, Canada, and Australia are not. 
2.4 Accidents 
2.4.1 Definition 
Accident is an event that leads to damage, environmental consequences, with 
injuries or fatalities and economic loss [7]. Even though the technology, 
regulation, training, etc. are always developed to ensure the safety of the MTS, 
accidents are still occurred. Because of the large amount of loss caused by the 
accidents, many countries establish Maritime Transportation Safety Agency 
(MTSA) to prevent the accidents. This body usually investigate the accidents 
carefully, finds the causative factors of the accidents, learn it as a part of 
countermeasure action, and to conclude some safety recommendation to avoid 
the same event that lead to an accident. The examples of MTSA and its total 
investigation report publications are: 
1. Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), 9684 investigation reports (64 reported 
in English) [12] [13]. 
2. Indonesia National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), 54 
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investigation reports. 
3. United Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), 536 
investigation reports [14]. 
4. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), 3270 investigation reports [15]. 
5. Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB), 339 investigation reports 
[16]. 
6. United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 225 
investigation reports [17]. 
7. European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 566 investigation reports [18]. 
From the investigation report published by MTSA, author found interesting 
classification of the accident based on the types, time occurrence, and place 
occurrence. In terms of accident place, it is classified into accident that occur on 
the sea, on the port, and along the river. In terms of time occurrence, accidents 
are classified into 3 times, inter alia: 
Day time is time range covering the period in which the sun is above the horizon, 
starting thirty minutes after nautical dawn and ending thirty minutes before 
nautical dusk begins 
Night time is the time range that includes the time between thirty minutes after 
nautical dusk and thirty minutes before nautical dawn 
Twilight time the twilight time is a combination of nautical dawn and dusk, 
including thirty minutes before and after the nautical time.  
There are several types of accidents. Sometimes different MTSA use a same 
term for the same type of accident and sometime different. Hereby the definition 
of accident that is analyzed in this study, taken by EMSA definition:  
Occupational accident is the accident that affect to the person who work 
whether on the ship or the proses of transporting goods. 
Collision is the accident caused by ships striking or being struck by another ship, 
15 
 
regardless of whether the ships are underway, anchored or moored. This type of 
casualty event does not include ships striking underwater wrecks. The collision 
can be with other ship or with multiple ships or ship not underway. 
Contact is the accident caused by ships striking or being struck by an external 
object. The objects can be: Floating object (cargo, ice, other or unknown); Fixed 
object, but not the sea bottom; or Flying object. However, in this study, author 
analyses contact together with collision become one category, namely collision. 
Fire/explosion is an uncontrolled ignition of flammable chemicals and other 
materials on board of a ship. Fire is the uncontrolled process of combustion 
characterized by heat or smoke or flame or any combination of these. Explosion 
is an uncontrolled release of energy which causes a pressure discontinuity or 
blast wave. 
Capsizing/Listing is a condition where the ship no longer floats in the right-
side-up mode due to: negative initial stability (negative metacentric height), or 
transversal shift of the center of gravity, or the impact of external forces. 
Capsizing when the ship is tipped over until disabled. Listing when the ship has 
a permanent heel or angle of loll. 
Damage to equipment is damage to equipment, system or the ship not covered 
by any of the other casualty type. 
Grounding/stranding is a moving navigating ship, either under command, 
under Power, or not under command, Drift(ing), striking the sea bottom, shore 
or underwater wrecks. 
Flooding/foundering is an accident when the ship is taking water on board. 
Foundering will be considered when the vessel has sunk. Foundering should 
only be regarded as the first casualty event if we do not know the details of the 
flooding which caused the vessel to founder. In the chain of events foundering 
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can be the last casualty event in this case there is the need to add accidental 
events. Flooding refers to a casualty when a vessel takes water on board and can 
be progressive (if the water flow is gradual) and massive (if the water flow is 
extensive) 
Hull failure is a failure affecting the general structural strength of the ship. 
Loss of control is a total or temporary loss of the ability to operate or maneuver 
the ship, failure of electric power, or to contain on board cargo or other 
substances (electrical, power, directional control, and containment). 
Missing is accident to a ship whose fate is undetermined with no information 
having being received on the loss and whereabouts after a reasonable period 
of time.  
2.4.2 Accident Models 
There are several analysis terms used to describe accident phenomena, such as 
approaches, techniques, frameworks, methodologies, methods, and models. 
Several researchers, such as Leveson [19], Grabowski et al [20], Nikolas et al in 
2004, Laracy in 2006, which are included in Mullai and Paulson use an accident 
model [11]. According to Mullai and Paulson, an accident model is an abstract 
concept representing the occurrence and development of an accident. This tool 
is also used to view and think about how and why an accident can occur and 
make predictions. 
All accident models can be distinguished as three main types, sequential, 
epidemiological, and systemic [21] [11] [22]. This categorization relates to 
assumptions of accident causation. It helps researchers explain system theory 
concepts into accident models [22]. Each Model description will be explained 
in the following sections. 
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i. Sequential Accident Models 
This is the simplest type of accident model describing accidents as the result of 
time-ordered sequences of discrete events. It assumes that an undesirable event, 
i.e. a ‘root cause’ initiates a sequence of events which lead to an accident and 
that the cause-effect relation between consecutive events is linear and 
deterministic. This implies that the accident is the result of this root cause which, 
if identified and removed, will prevent a recurrence of the accident [22].  
Examples of this model are: 
- Domino Model (Heinrich in 1931),  
- Five Whys Method (Ohno in 1988),  
- Framework for Maritime Risk Assessment (Harrald et al in1998),  
- Fault Tree Analysis (Watson, 1961 cited in Ericson in 1999) 
- Bowtie Model (Hollnagel in 2008).  
Hollnagel said that this model is attractive because it encourages thinking in a 
causal series rather than causal nets [23]. Furthermore, this model can be 
described by graphics, which facilitates communication of the results. 
This model works well for losses caused by physical component failures, or the 
actions of humans in relatively simple systems, and generally offers a good 
description of the events leading up to an accident. However, the cause-effect 
relationship between the management, organizational, and human elements in a 
system are poorly defined by this model and they are unable to depict how these 
causal factors trigger the accident. 
ii. Epidemiological Accident Models 
This model describes an accident like a disease, an outcome of a combination 
of factors, some manifest and some latent, that happen to exist together in space 
and time [21]. In other words, contributing failures are ‘latent’ and ‘active’ 
failures [22]. Latent conditions, e.g. management practices or organizational 
cultures, are likened to resident pathogens and can lie dormant within a system 
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for a long time. Such organizational factors can create conditions at a local level, 
i.e. where operational tasks are conducted, which negatively impact on an 
individual’s performance (e.g. fatigue or high workload). The scene is then set 
for ‘unsafe acts’, such as errors and violations, to occur. Therefore, adverse 
consequences of latent failures breach the defenses of a system.  
Examples of this model are: 
- Swiss Cheese Model (Reason in 1990 and 1997) 
- ‘Sharp end’-‘blunt end’ interactions (Wood et al in 1994) 
- Cognitive Reliability and Error Assessment Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel 
in 1998) 
- Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann 
and Shappel in 2003) 
- Models of pathological system (organization) states 
- Tripod Beta 
Hollnagel (2008) says that epidemiological models are valuable because they 
provide a basis for discussing the complexity of accidents that overcome the 
limitations of sequential models [23]. The notion of latent factors simply cannot 
be reconciled with the simple idea of a causal series, but requires a more 
powerful representation, at least that of a causal network. This means that the 
analysis cannot be a search for simple causes, but must involve an account of 
more complex interactions among different factors. Unfortunately, this 
epidemiological model is no longer able to account for the increasingly complex 
nature of STE Systems [22]. 
iii. Systemic Accident Models 
The systemic model is designed to describe characteristic performance at the 
level of the system as a whole, rather than on the level of specific cause-effect 
“mechanisms” [21]. It describes the losses as the unexpected behavior of a 
system caused by uncontrolled relationships between its constituent parts 
(Underwood and Waterson, 2013). In Underwood and Waterson’s report, 
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accidents are not created by a combination of latent and active failure, or the 
result of a sequence of cause-effect events. Accidents are the result of humans 
and technology operating in ways that seem rational at a local level, but 
unknowingly create unsafe conditions within the system that remained 
uncorrected. Simply removing the ‘root cause’ from a system is not the key for 
preventing the recurrence of an accident. A holistic approach is required, 
whereby safety deficiencies throughout the entire system must be identified and 
addressed. 
Examples of this model are: 
- Control Theory (Sheridan in 1992) 
- Accimap (Rasmussen in 1997) 
- Neural Networks (NN) Concept (Hashemi et al in 1995; Le Blanc et al in 
2001) 
- Simulation and Expert judgement (Harrald et al in 1998) 
- Fuzzy Logic (Sii et al in 2001) 
- Bayesian Belief Network concept (BBN) (Merrick and Singh, 2003; Trucco 
et al in 2008) 
- Systems Theoretic Analysis Model and Processes Model (STAMP) 
(Leveson in 2004 and 2011) 
- The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollagel in 2004 and 
2012) 
- Risk Based Approaches (Vanem and Skjong in 2006; Celik et al in 2010) 
The distinction between the epidemiological and systemic perspective of 
accidents, therefore, seems to be subtle. Whilst the system model is arguably the 
dominant concept within accident analysis research, systemic models are yet to 
gain widespread acceptance within the practitioner community [22]. 
2.4.3 Accident Model Selection 
Even though Systemic Accident Models provide a depth of understanding of 
complex accidents better than other models, it is not efficient to apply this model 
for simple accidents [22]. Therefore, the model should be correctly utilized 
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based on the complexity of the accident or the system. In order to determine a 
system’s characteristics, Hollnagel proposed a means of characterizing a system, 
modifying the work of Perrow in 1984, which describes a system using the 
dimensions of coupling and manageability [23] as shown in Fig. 2.5.  
The coupling of a system can vary between being loose and tight and refers to 
how the subsystem and/or components are functionally connected or dependent 
upon each other [22]. Tightly coupled systems can be characterized as follows: 
- Buffers and redundancies are purposely part of the design 
- Delays in processing are not possible 
- Process sequences are invariant 
- The substitution of supplies, equipment, and personnel are limited and 
anticipated in the design 
- There is little slack possible in supplies, equipment, and personnel 
- There is only one method to reach the goal 
- Tightly coupled systems are difficult to control because an event in one part 
of the system will quickly spread to other parts. 
The complexity of the system can be seen by how easy it is to manage, is it 
tractable or intractable? The characteristics of a tractable system are: 
- The principles of the system’s functioning are known 
- System descriptions are simple and with few details 
- The system does not change while it is being described 
While Hollnagel proposed the chart to categorize the type of the system [23], 
Underwood and Waterson modified the chart and wrote the names of each area 
to make it easier to be understood [22]. With the chart (Fig. 2.5), the researcher 
can utilize or develop the correct model to analyze the accident in each field. 
Underwood and Waterson has provided where the MTS in the chart. From that 
figure, reader can easily select epidemiological accident model. This means that 
MTS is better analyzed by finding the latent and active failures to describe how 
the accident occurred. 
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Fig. 2.6 Accident Model Categorization, whether Sequential, Epidemiological, or 
Systemic (adapted from [22]) 
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Chapter 3  
4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) 
Model 
3.1 Introduction 
The proposed MOP model was developed for the maritime domain. As stated 
previously, MTS is better explained by the epidemiological model that consists of 
latent conditions, barriers, and active conditions. The proposed MOP model is a 
combination of the epidemiological, Septigon, and IM models.  
The Septigon model categorizes the MTS into seven domains: society and culture, 
physical environment, practice, technology, individual, group, and organizational 
environment networks [4].  Fig. 3.1 show the septigon model and table 3.1 explain 
the definition of its domains. All domains are connected to and affected by each 
other in the MTS. Any error in one domain can affect the entire system.  
In 2000, Furusho proposed a simpler system called the IM model. This model 
consists of 4M factors (man, machine, media, and management) that are connected 
by the individual element (I) as the core of the system [5] [6]. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 The Septigon Model: Society and culture, Physical Environment, Practice, 
Technology, Individual, Group, and Organizational environment Network [4] 
Table 3.1 The Septigon Model Term Definitions 
Term Definition 
Society and 
culture. 
It refers to the sociopolitical and economic environment in which the 
organization operates. 
Physical 
Environment.  
It refers to the surrounding environment, such as weather, visibility 
conditions, obstructions to vision, physical workspace environment (air 
quality, temperature, lighting conditions, noise, smoke, vibration, ship 
motion, etc.) 
Practice.  It refers to such aspects as informal rules and custom. However, these are not 
related to written procedures or instructions. 
Technology.  It refers to equipment, vehicles, tools, manuals, and signs, and also deals with 
human machine interaction issues. 
Individual.  It refers to the human component, and incorporates such aspects as individual 
physical or sensory limitations, human physiology, psychological limitation, 
individual workload management and experience, skill, and knowledge. 
Group.  It refers to the relational and communication aspects, such as communication, 
interactions, team skills, crew/team resource management training, 
supervision, and regulatory activities. Group also deals with leadership, and 
teamwork. 
Organizational 
environment.  
It refers to the company and management as well as the procedures, policies, 
norms, and formal rules. 
Society and 
Culture
Physical 
Environment
Practice
Technology Individual
Group
Organizational 
Environment
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Table 3.2 Description of the 4 M Factors in IM Model 
4M Factors Descriptions 
Man This term means the individual error of person such as master, an officer, a pilot, 
a VTIS’s officer, and crew on board.  
This error has relation of “Human Factors” including the mind stress or the 
mistake without the problem of responsibility 
Machine This term means defect and breakdowns such as damages of hull and failures of 
engines and ship’s other facilities. 
Media This term has a considerably wide meaning and indicates and environmental 
condition that affects the information on the communication and the service, the 
weather condition, the harbor facilities, and the navigational aids for sailing. 
Management The activity of the company, the group, and the administration for safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 IM Model (revised [5] [6]) 
 
IM Model is shown in Fig. 3.2 and the definition of 4M Factors in IM model is 
written in Table 3.2. However, the IM Model is designed for the navigational domain. 
All the relation whether are internal or intermediate concept are the interaction 
among the system to the safe in navigational activity. Since the Maritime Traffic 
System is wider than navigational activity, this model can be developed to a wider 
activity including the process of the preparation activity before sailing, the 
regulation, maintenance of the ships, and so on. 
Internal Concept: 
1  Human Relation 
2  Human Interface 
3  Media Information 
4  Self Control 
Intermediate Concept: 
a  Man-Machine Interface for Navigation 
b  Information Aids for Navigation 
c  Maritime Environmental Protection 
d  Bridge Resource Management 
External Concept: 
i  STCW  
ii  SOLAS 
iii  MARPOL 
iv  COLREG 
  Man 
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  Management  I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
a 
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i 
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iv 
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The proposed MOP model is drawn three-dimensionally as a three-sided inverted 
pyramid with four corners, representing the 4M factors, and six edges, representing 
an interaction between two 4M factors that are connected by the edges, as shown in 
Fig. 3.3.  
The edges, called line relations, show that the system is a result of interactions 
among the 4M factors. Failures that are classified in a corner of the MOP model do 
not always occur only because of that particular corner. Often, the failure is caused 
by some effect from the other corners. When there are failures caused by several 
corners, this implies that the line relations connecting those corners also contribute 
to the instability of the system. For example, consider a failure in communication. 
Communication cannot be classified into one corner because communication is 
related to all four corners. A failure in communication among seafarers is classified 
as man factor (M1) because this type of communication depends on a person. Often, 
several seafarers do not share information with other seafarers. However, 
communication failures among ships and between port administrations do not 
belong to the man factor. They can belong to either the management or the machine 
factor and can be affected by the media factor. The classification of failure depends 
on the condition of the accident. When a line relation contributes to an accident, a 
preventive action for the line relation has to be determined. Thus, for a safe system, 
all corners and edges should be reliable and balanced. 
 
Fig. 3.3 MOP model 
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Because the MTS consists of latent conditions, barriers, and active conditions, any 
accident that occurs in the MTS should be traced for each of these factors separately. 
Each factor (corner) of the MOP model is represented in the epidemiological model 
as shown in Fig. 3.1. In this figure, the individual, M1 (man factor), receives some 
information from M3 (media factor: environment) and from M2 (machine factor: 
crew complement); subsequently, this information is used for decision making. 
Hazard perceptions are also influenced by M4 (management factor).  
Table 3.3 lists the definitions and examples of the corners in the MOP model. By 
understanding the definitions, it is easier to determine the causes of the accidents 
using the epidemiological model, and then, preventive actions can be considered. In 
addition, the characteristics of several accidents can be explored by analyzing their 
accident reports for any tendencies, as carried out in this research. 
Table 3.3 Definitions and examples of MOP Model 
4M Factors Definition Examples 
Man  
(M1) 
Human elements that affect people 
doing their tasks 
Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, Memory, 
Motivation, Alertness, Experience, etc. 
Machine 
(M2) 
Tools that help people to complete 
their tasks, including technology 
Equipment, Information displays, 
Environmental design, Crew 
complements, Construction, etc. 
Media  
(M3) 
Environmental factors that affect the 
system and/or people 
Climatic/ weather conditions 
(temperature, noise, sea state, vibration, 
wave, tide, wind, etc.), Economic 
conditions, Social politics, Culture, etc. 
Management 
(M4) 
All elements that can control the 
system and/or people 
Training scheme, Communication, 
Work schedule, Supervising/ 
monitoring, Regulatory activities, 
Procedures, Rules, Maintenance, etc. 
There are 2 steps to analyze accident reports using MOP model, Corner Analysis 
(CA) and Line Relation Analysis (LRA). These 2 steps will be explained in detail in 
the next subsection. 
3.2 The Concept 
The MOP model consists of two steps to describe the occurrence of an accident. 
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3.2.1 Corner Analysis (CA) 
This step traces and lists all failures that caused accidents and classifies them 
into 4M based on the definitions of each corner of the MOP model. Then, we 
count the number of failures after all reports are analyzed. The failures listed are 
causative factors (CFs), which is the outcome of this step.  
CFs are also listed based on the accident development stage of the accident 
(ADS). There are three stages of accident development, the beginning, the 
accident itself, and the evacuation process, labeled as stage 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively [24]. In analyzing accidents, especially to find the causative factors, 
the accident development stages need to be carefully considered because the 
failure may have occurred in any one of these stages or even in all the stages. 
The failures that occurred before the accident, or in other words the fails/ 
problems/ conditions leading to the accident, are categorized in Stage 1. After 
the probability of the accident is identified by the seamen, preventive action 
should be carried out. However, sometimes seamen face several problems at the 
same time and this causes them to fail to avoid the accident. This failures are 
categorized in Stage 2. Finally, after an accident occurs, the stakeholders related 
to the accident, should take some post-accident remediation. The failure that 
occurred in this post-accident remediation is categorized in Stage 3. Any failure 
in Stage 3 can cause other problems such as pollution and other accidents. For 
example, if the master does not carry out a post-collision check correctly, the 
other ship can be sunk and or capsized and there may be many victims. 
3.2.2 Line Relation Analysis (LRA) 
CFs listed in the result of CA do not only belong in one corner. Most of the CF 
has relation with other CFs, whether caused by or causing other CFs. In this step 
the relationship among all the CFs listed in the corners of the MOP model are 
explored. The relation of several CFs makes line relation and if we figure the 
relation to the geometry of MOP model (the inverted pyramid), the edge lines 
are existed representing the relation that perform chain. The chains made by 
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several CFs are called causative chains (CCs). By performing line relation 
analysis, we can understand which line relation is the most vulnerable to failure. 
3.3 Developments 
This section contains the development of the MOP model from the beginning to the 
last stage. This development gives the model the ability to analyze accident reports 
in more detail. This makes up the originality of this dissertation. Elements of this 
development of MOP model have been documented in detail in proceeding, journals, 
and prior publications in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 The development of MOP Model in MTS 
No. Year Development 
Published 
on 
Title Case study 
1. 
2012-
2013 
Creating MOP 
Model from 4M 
Factors 
ANC 2013 
A Study of Ship Accidents in 
Indonesia Using 4 M Factors [25] 
Case of Fire in 
Indonesia 
2. 
2014 
1. Defining MTS 
2. Defining 4 
corners of MOP 
Model 
ANC 2014 
The 4M Overturned Pyramid 
(MOP) Model in Maritime Traffic 
System for Safety at Sea [26] 
Explanation of 
MOP Model 
3. 
2015 
1. 2 step analysis: 
CA and LRA TransNav 
2015 
4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) 
Model: Case Studies on Indonesia 
and Japanese Maritime Traffic 
Systems (MTS) [27] 
Comparing 
Indonesian & 
Japanese 
Accidents 
4. 2. Detail analysis: 3 
Stages of accident 
development 
ANC 2015 
Analysis of Ship-Collision 
Accidents in United Kingdom 
using MOP Model [28] 
Case of 
collisions in 
UK 
5. 
2016 
1. 3 time occurrence 
zones 
ISOCEEN 
2015 
Introducing 4M Overturned 
Pyramid (MOP) Model to Analyze 
Accidents in Maritime Traffic 
System (MTS): A Case Study on 
Collisions in Japan Based on 
Occurrence Time [29] 
Case of 
collisions in 
Japan 
6. 2. Detail LRA for 
improper look-out 
ANC 2016 
Improper Look-out Leading to 
Ship Collisions in Japan [30] 
7. 3. Adding a 
causative chain list 
as the final outcome 
of MOP Model 
SENTA 
2016 
Causative Chain that Leads to Ship 
Collisions in Japanese Maritime 
Traffic System (MTS) as Final 
Outcome of MOP Model 
8. 
2017 
Transnav 
2017 
Causative Chain Difference for 
each Type of Accident in Japanese 
Maritime Traffic Systems (MTS) 
[31]  
Cases of 
collision and 
occupational 
accident in 
Japan 
The MOP model is generally based on Man-Machine-Media-Management (4M) 
30 
 
Factors. It is started from 4M factors concept and then evolved to MOP model. Back 
in 2012, the idea is to find the causative factor of ship accident in Indonesia. 4M 
factor was utilized to analyze the accident and causative factors was found.  In 
2013 until the beginning of 2014, the concept of 4M factor was developed to three 
dimensionally looks alike become three-sided inverted pyramid namely 4M 
Overturned Pyramid model or abbreviated to MOP model. The terms of “mop” is 
so familiar in daily life. Mop is a tool to clean up the dirty things. Hopefully MOP 
model also can be one alternative tool to clean up or reduce the ship accidents. 
In the end of 2014, the further development of MOP model is to make a detail 
definition of Marine Traffic Systems (MTS) and the definition of each 4M factors 
of MOP model itself. The definition of each 4M factors must be specified as the 
reference of the analysis, to focus the discussion regarding the exact definition of 
each 4M factors, remembering there are a lot of definition regarding 4M factors. In 
2015, the development of MOP model is in the analysis step. From the previous 
MOP model which just one step analysis called Corner Analysis (CA), the analysis 
that focus on the accident based on 4M factors only, become two steps. The first step 
is CA and the second step is Line Relation Analysis (LRA). LRA covers the 
relationship between each corner, so which corner-corner relation that have 
significant relation causing the accident could be known. 
In the end of 2015, the development is keep on going, this time the detailed CA was 
established. CA is consisted of four corners producing Causative Factor (CF) that 
represent in each corner as Man Corner, Machine Corner, Media Corner, and 
Management Corner. The development was conducted by adding analysis in 3 
different stages of accidents development. These stages are: 
Stage 1: Leading to accident (before the accident) 
Stage 2: Failure in avoiding accident (the accident time) 
Stage 3: Failure in evacuation process (after the accident) 
The aim of this addition is to get know in which stage the accident was happened. 
Is the behavior of seafarers before the accident that lead to accident, is the effort of 
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seafarers to avoiding the accident effective, or is the evacuation process effective 
enough to reduce the risk or fatality of the accident. The analysis of each stage could 
make the MOP model more detail in the analysis. 
In 2016, interesting analysis result regarding time occurrence was obtained. Based 
on 2008-2013 accident investigation report, the average day, night, and twilight 
periods were 12h 45m, 8h 10m, and 3h 05m, respectively. Accidents that happened 
at twilight were 154 cases during 3h 05m period works out to about 51 collisions 
per hour, while the number of accidents that happened at night were 240 cases during 
8h 10m period works out to only 30 collisions per hour. These facts stimulate the 
need to research the characteristic differences of collisions that happen in each time 
occurrence zone. Another interesting result is in collision accident, the dominant 
causative factor was “improper lookout”. Thus, the detailed analysis, especially 
LRA regarding the causing and caused CF by the improper lookout was needed. 
This analysis was the idea to add more detailed analysis to improve LRA in MOP 
model better. 
Because the CF of each accident was not standing alone, the LRA was established. 
More detail in LRA, the relation of each CF was modified into Causative Chain 
(CC) that allow us to know what CF causing another CF and caused by another CF. 
The development of MOP model is still on progress, the latest condition of MOP 
model development is the outcome of each analysis. The outcome of CA is CF list, 
while the LRA outcome is CC list. 
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Chapter 4  
Accidents in Several Countries 
Analyzed by MOP Model 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to see how reliable the MOP model is in characterizing accidents, the MOP 
model is applied to accidents in several countries in this chapter. Details of the steps 
of the MOP model are explained here. The data analyzed here is from accidents 
investigated by MTSA listed in Chapter 2. However, because of limitations in the 
data, only accidents in Japan, UK, US, and Australia are provided here. Fig. 4.1 
shows the number of investigated accidents from those countries.  
In Fig. 4.1, we can see the available data that can be re-analyzed by MOP model. 
Collision/contact was chosen for the analysis because it involves the largest number 
among all accident types. The number of ship involved in the accidents is more than 
the number of cases, as shown in Fig. 4.2. 
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Fig. 4.1 Number of investigation reports classified by accident type in 2008-2013 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Number of collision cases and the ships involved in 2008-2013 
Fig. 4.2 provides the number of cases and ships involved that are analyzed in this 
dissertation. In total, there are 81 collisions and 129 ships involved in this research. 
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4.2 Corner analysis (CA) 
In this step, all the causative factors (CFs), from every ship that led to collision are 
broken down, and classified into three stages of accident development. Each 
causative factor may have several failures. Thus, every ship has a maximum of three 
failures if it fails in every stage for every CF. If the collision involves two ships, the 
maximum number of failures is 6. In total, there are 129 ships involved in collisions, 
this means that the maximum number of failures is 387 for every CF, again if all the 
ships failed in every stage of accident development. Tables 4.1 - 4.4 provide the list 
of CF as outcome of this step and are categorized as man (M1), machine (M2), media 
(M3), and management (M4) factor. 
We can see from the tables that CF in M1 has the highest number of failures. These 
are from careless seaman monitoring/identifying any risk, or in maintaining proper 
lookout, or communications among seamen (or with pilot), and in understanding 
conditions (wrong judgement/decision).  
The comparisons of each country are provided in Fig. 4.3 - 4.7. The comparisons 
use occurrence ratio, not number of failures, because the number of ships analyzed 
is different between Japan, US, Australia, and UK. The occurrence ratio of each CF 
is counted by dividing the total number of failures by the maximum number of 
failures for each country. 
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Table 4.1 Number of failures for each CF categorized as M1  
Codes Causative Factors (CF)   Number of failures 
   J US A UK T 
CARELESS SEAMAN        
M101-01 in communication among the seamen (or with pilot)  8 12 5 19 44 
M101-02 in maintaining proper lookout  25 7 10 18 60 
M101-03 in monitoring/identifying any accident risk  23 12 9 18 62 
M101-04 in understanding condition (wrong judgement/decision)  12 14 6 9 41 
M101-05 in deciding speed  10 7 0 6 23 
M101-06 in deciding course alteration  9 2 0 7 18 
M101-07 doing erratic/ineffective action in avoiding accident  3 1 4 11 19 
M101-08 in flashing light signal  1 0 1 0 2 
M101-09 in blasting sound signal  2 3 0 7 12 
M101-10 in wearing/utilizing safety/survival devices  2 1 1 3 7 
M101-11 in preventing flooding   1 1 0 0 2 
M101-12 in carrying out / following some procedures/ rules  0 3 4 14 21 
INCAPABILITY OF SEAMAN/PERSONNEL        
M102-01 in operating navigational equipment (unfamiliar)  4 3 1 8 16 
M102-02 in understanding signal from other vessels  1 0 0 1 2 
M102-03 in controlling the operation  0 13 1 12 26 
M102-04 in arranging working procedure    0 9 3 11 23 
 (mooring, berthing, towing) 
M102-05 in performing crossing agreement  0 1 0 0 1 
M102-06 in executing commands from master/pilot/company rule  0 3 2 1 6 
M103-01 focus of the seamen was distracted  11 6 2 5 24 
SOME SEAMEN WERE NOT ON THE BRIDGE        
M104-01 watch keeper was not on the bridge  3 0 1 1 5 
M104-02 master was not on the bridge  2 0 1 1 4 
HUMAN ELEMENT PROBLEM        
M105-01 fatigue  1 1 1 6 9 
M105-02 lethargy  0 0 0 1 1 
M105-03 sleep inertia  0 0 0 1 1 
M105-04 stress  0 0 0 1 1 
M105-05 intoxication  0 2 0 2 4 
M105-06 complacent attitude  0 0 0 3 3 
 TOTAL FAILURES  118 101 52 166 437 
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Table 4.2 Number of failures for each CF categorized as M2  
Codes Causative Factors (CF)   Number of failures 
   J US A UK T 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE        
M201-01 AIS*/radar could not show information  3 1 1 1 6 
M201-02 whistle/audio signal was not working  3 1 1 0 5 
M201-03 propeller/thruster problem  0 0 0 5 5 
M201-04 course was not changed  0 1 1 0 2 
M201-05 electrical failure  0 1 1 0 2 
M201-06 main engine failure  0 2 0 1 3 
M201-07 steering ability was reduced  0 2 1 0 3 
M201-08 equipment strength below operational standard  0 3 0 1 4 
CONSTRUCTION DAMAGE        
M202-01 mooring line broken  0 1 0 0 1 
M202-02 hull damage  0 1 0 0 1 
M202-03 bollard damaged  0 1 0 0 1 
UNINSTALLED EQUIPMENT        
M203-01 safety navigational equipment was not installed  0 1 1 0 2 
 (AIS*, VDR**)  
M203-02 some equipment was missing/ not installed  0 1 0 0 1 
DESIGN FAILURE        
M204-01 engine control console not ergonomic  0 2 1 1 4 
M204-02 field of vision restricted  0 0 0 4 4 
M204-03 bridge design not ergonomic  0 0 0 3 3 
 TOTAL FAILURES  6 18 7 16 47 
*AIS= Automated Identification System 
**VDR=Voyage Data Recorder 
Table 4.3 Number of failures for each CF categorized as M3  
Codes Causative Factors (CF)   Number of failures 
   J US A UK T 
M301-01 busy traffic  8 6 0 2 16 
M302-01 strong flow tide  4 0 0 4 8 
M303-01 strong wind  4 4 1 4 13 
M304-01 rain  6 1 0 3 10 
M305-01 strong current  0 2 0 1 3 
M306-01 submerged debris  0 1 0 0 1 
M307-01 flood  0 1 0 0 1 
M308-01 restricted visibility (fog, rainfall, obstruction)  0 7 0 5 12 
M309-01 poor lighting (too light or too dark)  0 5 0 1 6 
M310-01 narrow waterways  0 3 0 0 3 
M311-01 sound pollution  0 0 0 2 2 
 TOTAL FAILURES  22 30 11 22 85 
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Table 4.4 Number of failures for each CF categorized as M4  
Codes Causative Factors (CF)   Number of failures 
   J US A UK T 
POOR COMMUNICATION   0 0 0 0  
M401-01 among onshore & other vessel utilizing radio  5 1 0 4 10 
INCOMPLETE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM   0 0 0 0  
M402-01 no night order in busy track  0 0 0 1 1 
M402-02 insufficient post collision check lists  0 0 0 3 3 
M402-03 in an operation plan  0 0 1 8 9 
M402-04 guidance on navigation practices  0 0 1 5 6 
 was not included/effective 
POOR MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ON BOARD   0 0 0 0  
M403-01 in understanding the passage plane (in new area)  2 2 1 0 5 
M403-02 in monitoring the hours of work and rest   1 1 0 8 10 
M403-03 number of men on the bridge  1 0 0 4 5 
M403-04 sole lookout in busy/ danger area  1 0 0 1 2 
M403-05 seaman has an expired/ illegal certificate  3 0 0 1 4 
M403-06 in distributing job tasks  3 1 0 3 7 
M404-01 poor application of safety management system  2 6 1 6 15 
POOR MANAGEMENT FROM ONSHORE   0 0 0 0  
M405-01 in identifying/monitoring/communicating  4 9 0 5 18 
 any accident risk  
M405-02 in monitoring pilot performance  0 0 0 2 2 
M405-03 company did not establish/follow  0 4 0 3 7 
 equipment change procedures 
 TOTAL FAILURES  22 24 4 54 104 
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Fig. 4.3 Occurrence ratio of CF in man factor 
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Fig. 4.4 Occurrence ratio of CF in machine factor 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Occurrence ratio of CF in media factor 
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Fig. 4.6 Occurrence ratio of CF in management factor 
4.3 Line Relation Analysis (LRA) 
After getting all the CFs, this step connects several CFs to establish causative chains 
(CCs). Tables 4.5 – 4.8 below is the result of the LRA and the CC as the outcome is 
broken down in each country. The first CF code on the left means that that CF causes 
the CF following ‘>’. For example, in Table 4.5, CC number 1 is M103-01> M101-
03. This means that M103-01 (Focus of the seamen was distracted) causing M101-
03 (Careless seaman in monitoring/ identifying any accident risk). This CC 
happened only once in the 40 ships involved in Japanese ship collisions in 2008-
2013. Another example is CC number 12, which had the largest number of 
occurrences, five. This means that this CC happen 5 times or there were 5 ships that 
collided because of this CC. This implies that there are many seamen that lose focus 
(mainly related to lookout), which do not keep proper look-out, thus they fail to 
monitor/identify any accident risk. This kind of chain need to be found to initiate 
preventive action. 
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Table 4.5 Number of causative chains that lead to collision in Japan, 2008-2013. 
No.   Causative Chain (CC)  amount 
1   M103-01> M101-03    1 
2   M101-08> M101-03> M101-06   1 
3   M101-01> M101-03    1 
4    M101-03> M101-09   1 
5  M102-01> M101-02     2 
6   M101-02> M101-03> M101-07   1 
7  M403-06> M101-02> M101-03    1 
8  M401-01> M101-02> M101-03    1 
9  M403-01> M101-02> M101-03> M101-04   1 
10 M103-01> M101-04> M101-02> M101-03    1 
11  M101-04> M101-02> M101-03    2 
12 M403-02> M105-01> M101-02> M101-03    1 
13  M104-01> M101-02> M101-03> M101-05   1 
14 M101-04> M104-01> M101-02> M101-03    1 
15 M101-04> M103-01> M101-02> M101-03    1 
16  M103-01> M101-02> M101-03    5 
17  M103-01> M101-02> M101-03> M101-05. M101-06  1 
18   M301-01> M101-03> M101-05. M101-06  1 
19    M101-03> M101-05. M101-06  1 
20  M304-01> M201-01> M101-03> M101-05. M101-06  1 
21   M101-01> M102-02> M101-05. M101-06  1 
22   M301-01> M101-04> M101-05. M101-06  1 
23    M101-04> M101-02> M101-06  1 
24    M101-04> M101-05   1 
25   M101-01> M101-04> M101-06   1 
26   M101-01> M101-04    1 
27  M403-06> M101-01> M101-04    1 
28   M101-01> M101-05    1 
29  M105-01> M101-01> M101-07    1 
30 M302-01> M101-05      1 
31 M304-01> M201-01      2 
32 M401-01> M405-01      2 
33 M403-01> M403-03> M403-04     1 
In Tables 4.5- 4.8, those causative chain (CC) not aligned on the left are aimed at 
showing that there are causative factor (CF) that make chains but with different 
heads and/or tails. The most common CF that forms a chain in Japanese accident 
(from Table 4.5) is M101-02 (Careless seaman in maintaining proper look-out) and 
M101-03 (Careless seaman in monitoring/identifying any accident risk) which are 
also the most common CF gained from corner analysis (CA). The CC (M101-02> 
M101-03) is called the core CC. This core CC has several heads or causing CFs and 
tails or caused CF. 
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Table 4.6 Number of causative chains that lead to collision in US, 2008-2013. 
No.   Causative Chain (CC)  amount 
1     M101-02> M103-01     1 
2    M102-06> M101-02> M103-01     1 
3    M103-01> M101-02      1 
4   M101-05> M102-03> M101-02      1 
5   M105-05> M102-03       1 
6  M201-06> M201-02> M102-03       1 
7  M102-04> M101-10> M102-03       1 
8  M201-07> M101-01> M102-03       1 
9  M403-01> M404-01> M102-03       1 
10  M310-01> M301-01        1 
11  M310-01> M301-01> M102-03> M101-04> M101-03> M102-04> M103-01   1 
12     M101-04> M101-03> M101-07    1 
13      M101-03> M101-01    1 
14      M101-03> M102-03    1 
15     M102-04> M101-03> M101-06> M102-01   1 
16    M102-04> M101-01      1 
17 M304-01> M303-01> M308-01> M102-04> M101-01> M101-03     1 
18   M308-01> M201-01> M102-03> M101-03     1 
19     M102-03> M101-03> M101-04> M102-06> M103-01  1 
20     M203-01> M101-03> M101-04    1 
21     M403-01> M101-03> M101-04> M101-05> M101-01> M101-09 1 
22       M101-04> M101-05> M308-01  1 
23       M101-04> M101-06   1 
24       M101-04> M102-04> M101-03> M202-01 1 
25       M101-04> M101-01> M401-01  1 
26      M303-01> M101-04    1 
27      M102-03> M101-04> M101-05> M403-06  1 
28      M101-01> M101-04    1 
29    M102-01> M101-12> M101-01     1 
30    M105-05> M101-12> M102-01> M101-05    1 
31    M308-01> M101-12> M101-05> M102-03    1 
32    M308-01> M201-08      1 
33     M201-08> M405-03> M404-01    1 
34    M405-03> M201-08> M202-01     1 
35    M202-02> M201-05> M101-11     1 
36    M303-01> M202-03      1 
37    M305-01> M202-01      1 
38    M306-01> M201-07      1 
39    M201-06> M201-07      1 
40   M307-01> M405-01       1 
41    M405-01> M404-01      1 
42    M405-01> M405-03> M404-01     1 
Table 4.7 Number of causative chains that lead to collision in Australia, 2008-2013. 
No.   Causative Chain (CC)  amount 
1  M403-01> M101-01> M102-04> M101-03  1 
2   M101-02> M101-04> M101-03> M101-01 1 
3   M101-02> M101-04> M101-03  3 
4   M101-02> M104-02> M101-03  1 
5   M101-02> M104-01   1 
6 M101-03> M103-01> M101-02    1 
7  M103-01> M101-02> M102-01> M101-04> M101-03 1 
8     M101-04> M101-12 1 
9 M101-01> M102-03> M101-07> M102-06   1 
10 M402-03> M102-04     1 
11 M201-05> M201-07> M201-04    2 
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Table 4.8 Number of causative chains that lead to collision in UK, 2008-2013. 
No.   Causative Chain (CC)  amount 
1 M402-01> M105-02> M101-02> M101-03> M101-12> M101-09> M101-07 1 
2    M105-06> M101-12> M402-02  1 
3     M101-12> M405-02  1 
4     M101-12> M101-04  1 
5     M101-12> M101-04> M101-03 1 
6  M403-02> M403-03> M105-01> M101-12> M101-02> M101-03 1 
7    M105-05> M101-12> M101-06  1 
8   M105-06> M101-03> M101-12   1 
9   M105-06> M102-03> M101-12> M101-05  1 
10   M102-04> M101-01> M102-03   1 
11   M102-04> M101-01> M101-04   1 
12 M201-03> M101-06> M102-04     1 
13  M101-01> M102-04     1 
14  M101-01> M102-04> M101-03    1 
15  M101-01> M102-04> M102-03    1 
16   M201-06> M102-03>    1 
17   M403-06> M102-03    1 
18    M102-03> M101-01   1 
19  M101-06> M101-03> M102-03> M101-07   1 
20 M101-01> M101-06> M101-07> M102-03    1 
21   M101-01> M102-03    1 
22  M302-01> M303-01> M102-03    1 
23 M308-01> M101-02> M102-01> M102-03    1 
24   M105-04> M102-03> M101-03> M101-05  1 
25    M101-04> M101-03> M102-04> M101-07 1 
26      M101-01> M101-07 1 
27 M102-01> M201-01> M101-02> M101-03> M101-05> M101-06> M101-07 1 
28   M101-01> M102-02> M101-09> M101-03> M101-07 1 
29  M101-02> M101-01> M101-04> M101-06> M101-03> M101-07 1 
30    M104-01> M101-02> M101-03> M101-07 1 
31     M311-01> M101-03>  1 
32    M204-01> M101-02> M101-03  1 
33   M101-01> M402-02    1 
34  M101-04> M101-01> M101-02> M102-01   1 
35   M204-02> M101-02    1 
36    M101-02> M102-01> M102-03> M101-03 1 
37    M101-02> M102-01> M102-04  1 
38    M101-02> M103-01> M101-07> M101-09 1 
39    M101-02> M101-03   1 
40 M304-01> M308-01> M201-01> M101-02> M403-02> M105-01  1 
41     M403-02> M105-01  1 
42      M105-01> M403-02 1 
43    M402-03> M403-06> M405-01> M201-03 2 
44    M404-01> M402-04> M405-01  2 
45    M402-03> M402-04> M405-01  2 
46    M402-03> M201-03   2 
47   M404-01> M402-03    2 
48 M405-01> M402-04> M101-01> M102-01    1 
49 M102-06> M101-10      1 
50 M403-03> M403-04      1 
51 M104-02> M101-01      1 
52 M201-03> M204-01      1 
53 M105-03> M102-01      1 
54 M302-01> M101-04> M101-03     1 
55 M404-01> M405-02> M405-01     1 
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There are several highlighted causative factors and causative chain in Tables 4.5 – 
4.8.  Table 4.9 explains the definition of the highlights. 
Table 4.9 Terms and definitions of highlighted CF 
Type of highlight Terms Definitions 
CF Repeated CF The CF that occurred repeated in the accidents 
CF Connecting CF The CF that connected or in between 2 repeated CFs 
CF1> CF2 Repeated CC The CC that consists of 2 CFs and occurred repeated in the  
  accidents 
CF1> CF2> CF3 Repeated CC The CC that consists of 3 CFs and occurred repeated in the  
  accidents 
  
From Tables 4.5 – 4.8, the causing and caused repeated CF can be known. Thus, CA 
provides what CF causing the accident, what CF were repeated, how many times 
those CFs occurred and what CF were significant causing the accident. Then LRA 
provides the connections, what CF are leading to, as well as the CF that occurred 
after, the repeated and/or significant CF, what CFs form CC and how many CC 
occurred. 
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Chapter 5  
Specific Topics 
As a simple model, MOP can be used for specific topics depending on requirements. 
We will look at two examples, the utilization of MOP model to examine the 
characteristics of accidents that happen in three-time occurrences (day, night, and 
twilight) and the characteristics of improper look-out.  
5.1 Introduction 
MOP model has been utilized to characterize accidents in several countries. From 
these, the author found an interesting pattern about time occurrence of the accidents. 
Accidents can be categorized base on time occurrence, day, night, or twilight. The 
number of collisions occurring at twilight is almost the same with the number of 
collisions occurring at night; although a larger number of collisions occurred during 
the day [28]. However, the total number of hours included in twilight are much 
shorter than the number considered as night. This simple observation suggests that 
the characteristics of collisions occurring at twilight need further studied.  
This chapter provides an analysis of collisions found in Japanese MTS from 2008 -
2013 utilizing MOP model based on three time occurrences. The Japan coast guard 
48 
 
(JCG) and Japan P&I club (JPIC) have reported that most collisions in Japan occur 
between 4 and 6 am [32] [33], and many are due to improper look-out. JCG reported 
collisions occurring in 2008 for all types of vessels and JPIC reported collisions for 
cargo ships in 2011. 
Our analysis found that the most frequent cause of collision was improper look-out. 
Even though the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed rules for 
navigation, The 1972 International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs), improper look-out is still the dominant factor. In rule 5 regarding 
Look-out, “every vessel shall, at all times, maintain a proper look-out by sight and 
hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances 
and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and the risk of collision” 
[34]. Proper look-out is very important because most of collision worldwide are 
caused by improper look-out.  
The aims of this chapter are to discuss more details about improper look-out which 
dominate the cause of collision, as well as the reasons for failure that cause the 
improper look-out. In addition to all accidents, accidents related to improper look-
out will be classified into three time occurrence zones. 
5.2 Data 
The data analyzed in this chapter refer to the collision accident reports in Japan from 
2008 to 2013 published on Japan Transportation Safety Board’s (JTSB) website with 
a total of 1090 cases from 3090 total maritime accidents [12]. The number of 
accidents that happen in three time occurrence zones as well as the number of reports 
written in English are shown in Fig. 5.1.  
In this study, time occurrence has been divided into three groups, namely, day, night, 
and twilight. Day time covers the period in which the sun is above the horizon, 
starting thirty minutes after nautical dawn and ending thirty minutes before nautical 
dusk. Night time is the time between thirty minutes after nautical dusk and thirty 
49 
 
minutes before nautical dawn. Twilight time is a combination of nautical dawn and 
dusk, including thirty minutes before and after nautical time. It was decided to 
include thirty minutes before and after the true nautical twilight in twilight time, 
because sometimes accidents had a proceeding incident about 30 minutes before the 
accident, or the incident itself may have been affected by light caused by the sun’s 
movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Number of collisions at each time occurrence  
From the 1,090 collisions that occurred during 2008-2013, the average day, night, 
and twilight periods were 12h 45m, 8h 10m, and 3h 05m, respectively, traced by the 
timeanddate.com website [35].  An interesting observation obtained from the data 
shown in Fig. 5.1 is that the ratio between the number of accidents that happened at 
twilight (154 cases) and during the twilight period (3h 05m) works out to about 51 
collisions per hour, while the number of accidents that happened at night (240 cases) 
and during the night period (8h 10m) works out to only 30 collisions per hour. These 
facts stimulate the need to research the characteristic differences of collisions that 
happen in each time occurrence zone. After obtaining the characteristics of the 
accidents for each time occurrence zone, the next step is to define the preventive 
action needed to avoid repetition of the same accident. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Day (12h 45m) Night (8h 10m) Twilight (3h 05m)
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ac
ci
d
en
t 
o
f E
R
 (
ca
se
s)
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ac
ci
d
en
t 
(c
as
es
)
Time Occurence
All collisions English Reported (ER)
50 
 
In this chapter, all the collision reports, which were written in English and published 
on the JTSB website between 2008 and 2013 are re-analyzed. During this period, 
the number of collisions that happened at day, night, and twilight were 7, 7, and 6, 
respectively [13]. In total, 20 collisions involving 40 ships have been re-analyzed. 
5.3 Results 
Both steps of the MOP model have several results, which are reported below. 
Corner Analysis (CA). From the 7, 7, and 6 collisions that happen at day, night, 
and twilight, respectively, there were 63, 49, and 51 failures, respectively, shown in 
Fig. 5.2. From the figure, we can see that the number of failures during the twilight 
is higher than those during the night time even though the number of collisions that 
are analyzed is smaller. This means that shipping operations at twilight are 
statistically more probable to have a failure than those at night time. From the 
corners in the Fig. 5.2, we can clearly see that the corner that dominates collisions 
in Japan is the one associated with the man factor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Recapitulation of the results of CA 
Tables 5.1-5.4 show the list of CFs and the number of failures in each time 
occurrence zone, day, night, and twilight time abbreviated as D, N, and T, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.1 Number of failures for each causative factor categorized as M1. 
Code Causative Factors (CF) D N T Total 
CARELESS SEAMAN   
M11-01 in communicating among the seamen (or with pilot) 7 0 1  8 
M11-02 in maintaining proper look-out 6 11 8  25 
M11-03 in monitoring/identifying any accident risk 6 6 11  23 
M11-04 in understanding condition (wrong judgment/ decision) 5 4 3  12 
M11-05 in deciding speed 8 1 1  10 
M11-06 in deciding course alteration 6 2 1  9 
M11-07 doing erratic/ineffective action in avoiding accident 0 1 2  3 
M11-08 in flashing light signal 0 1 0  1 
M11-09 in blasting sound signal 0 1 0  1 
M11-10 in wearing/utilizing safety/survival devices 1 1 0  2 
M11-11 in preventing flooding  0 0 1  1 
INCAPABILITY OF SEAMAN  
M12-01 in operating navigational equipment (unfamiliar) 2 1 0  3 
m12-02 in understanding signal from another vessel 1 0 0  1 
m13-01 focus of the seamen was distracted 3 3 5  11 
m14-01 master was not on the bridge 1 1 0  2 
HUMAN ELEMENT PROBLEM  
M15-01 fatigue 0 0 1  1 
 
Table 5.2 Number of failures for each causative factor categorized as M2. 
Code Causative Factors D N T Total 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE  
M21-01 AIS/Radar could not show information 2 1 0  3 
M21-02 whistle/audio signal was not working 2 0 1  3 
M21-03 course was not changed 0 0 1  1 
 
Table 5.3 Number of failures for each causative factor categorized as M3. 
Code Causative Factors D N T Total 
M3-01 busy traffic  4 0 4  8 
M3-02 strong flow tide 0 4 0  4 
M3-03 strong wind 0 2 2  4 
m3-04 rain  2 4 0  6 
 
Table 5.4 Number of failures for each causative factor categorized as M4. 
Code Causative Factors D N T Total 
POOR COMMUNICATION  
M41-01 among onshore & other vessel utilizing radio 2 2 1  5 
POOR MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ON BOARD 
M42-01 in understanding the passage plane (in new area) 1 0 1  2 
M42-02 in monitoring the hours of work and rest 0 0 1  1 
M42-03 number of man on the bridge  0 0 1  1 
M42-04 sole lookout in busy/ danger area 0 0 1  1 
M42-05 seaman has an expired/illegal certificate 0 2 1  3 
M42-06 in distributing job task 0 0 1  1 
M43-01 poor application of Safety Management System 0 1 1  2 
POOR MANAGEMENT FROM ONSHORE  
M44-01 in identifying/monitoring/communicating any risk accident 4 0 0  4 
52 
 
After getting the results from Tables 5.1-5.4, we know that improper look-out (M11-
02) is the most common CF. Thus, Table 5.5 was made to break down improper 
look- out in more detail.  
Table 5.5 Number of improper look-out 
Code Improper look-out D N T Total 
M11-0211 not noticing other vessel on opposite side of seamen 0 2 1  3 
M11-0221 not responding/hearing call through VHF 0 2 1  3 
M11-0231 not noticing/confirming compass bearing changes of other vessel 1 2 1  4 
M11-0232 not keeping watch of other vessel 1 2 1  4 
M11-0233 not utilizing radar correctly 1 2 1  4 
M11-0241 non at all 3 1 3  7 
 Total 6 11 8  25 
There are several articles that have reviewed what the mean of proper lookout is, 
such as those of Llana and Wisneskey [34] and The ACTs project consortium [36]. 
There are 3 ways of look-out stated in COLREGs rule 5, namely by sight, by hearing 
and by all available means. First, by sight means observing another vessel by the 
naked eye or by binoculars. Second, by hearing means detecting another vessel by 
her sound signals. Third, by all available means includes using several navigational 
tools, such as Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR), Differential Global 
Positioning System (DGPS) satellite navigation equipment, Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS), Night vision equipment, Information and 
communication via Very High Frequency (VHF) from other vessels or Vessel Traffic 
System (VTS), Information from navigational warnings or any other Navigation and 
piloting instruments. 
Based on the explanation above, improper look-out has been divided into three 
categories, namely by sight (M11-021), by hearing (M11-022) and by all available 
means (M11-023). However, there is an additional improper lookout named M11-
024 (non at all). This improper look-out means that the seamen were not conduction 
any proper look-out, neither by sight, hearing, nor all available means.  
Table 5.5 lists the improper look-out that happened in 14 out of 20 cases, since 6 
cases were not related to improper look-out, but rather were caused by other CFs. 
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Line Relation Analysis (LRA). Table 5.6 below shows how this step characterizes 
the improper look-out based on the time occurrence zone. Details of improper look-
out listed in Table 5.5 are written in the center portion of the table with causing factor 
on the left and caused factor on the right. The causing factor is the CF leading to the 
improper look-out. The caused factor is the CF that happens after and includes the 
impact of improper look-out.  
Table 5.6 Line relation analysis and its number of relations in each time occurrence 
 Numb of   Causing Improper Caused  Numb of  
 relation    Factors Look-out Factors  relation 
D N T (Total)    (Total) D N T 
0 1 0  (1) M11-09 M11-0211 M11-03  (2) 0 2 0 
0 0 1  (1) M13-01  M11-04  (1) 0 0 1 
0 2 1  (3) M13-01 M11-0221 M11-03  (2)  0 1 1 
0 0 1  (1) M11-0241 M11-0231 M11-03  (2)  1 0 1 
1 0 0  (1) M11-0232  M11-06  (1)  0 1 0 
0 2 0  (2) M11-04 
1 1 1  (3) M13-01 M11-0232 M11-03  (2)  0 1 1 
0 1 0  (1) M11-04  M11-0231  (1) 1 0 0 
0 0 1  (1) M43-01 M11-0233 M11-0231  (1)  0 0 1 
1 0 0  (1) M12-01  M11-0211  (1)  1 0 0 
0 1 0  (1) M13-01  
2 0 2  (4) M13-01 M11-0241 M11-03  (7)  3 1 3 
1 1 0  (2) M14-01         
 
Table 5.6 can be illustrated in a 3-dimensional graph shown in Fig. 5.3. This shows 
our modification of the MOP model for our specific need, improper look-out. In the 
case of improper look-out, there are no CF associated with the factors of machine 
(M2) and media (M3), however, in the management factor (M4) there is one CF that 
leads to improper look-out. 
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Fig. 5.3 Illustration of improper look-out in LRA 
5.4 Discussion 
The discussion is divided into two subsections. 
5.4.1 Time occurrence zone 
In this part, since there are no special characteristics for the time occurrence 
from LRA, more details related to the results from CA are discussed. From 
Tables 5.1 - 5.4, we compare the number of failures from each CF to see if there 
are any characteristic differences for each time occurrence zone. 
Day time. CFs that are significant in the day time are M11-01, M11-04, M11-
05, M11-06, and M44-08. This means that in the day time, failures that often 
occur are caused by careless seaman in communicating with other the seamen, 
understanding conditions (wrong judgment), deciding speed, deciding course 
alteration, and poor management from onshore in 
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identifying/monitoring/communicating any risk of accident. Accidents that are 
caused by poor management from onshore in identifying/ monitoring/ 
communicating any risk of accident only occurred in the day time. Different 
from other CFs, this CF was not seen to occur at night or at twilight time. 
Night time. While the highest number of failures mostly occur in the day time, 
night time also has several CFs with a high number of failures, such as M11-02 
and M3-01. M3-02 only happens at night. This means that CFs that occur at 
night do not vary a lot in comparison with those of the day time. 
Twilight. CF that are significant in the twilight time compared to other time 
occurrence zones are M11-03 and M13-01. M11-03 refers to careless seaman 
monitoring/identifying any risk of accident and M13-01 incapability of seaman 
to focus due to some distraction. Perhaps even caused by the glare of the sun or 
changes in light conditions. 
5.4.2 Improper look-out 
As Table 5.5 shows, we could not find any special characteristics for improper 
look-out in any of the time occurrence. The number of cases being re-analyzed 
are perhaps not enough to show any differences, even from the LRA in Table 
5.5. However, from Table 5.6 and Fig. 5.3, we find 8 CFs that are affected or 
affecting improper lookout, namely M11-03: careless in monitoring/identifying 
any accident risk, M11-04: careless by misunderstanding condition (wrong 
judgment), M11-06: careless in deciding course alteration, M11-09: careless in 
blasting sound signal, M12-01: lack of knowledge in operating navigational 
equipment (unfamiliar), M13-01: focus of seamen was distracted, M14-01: 
Master was not on the bridge, and M43-01: poor application of Safety 
Management System. Of the 8 CFs, only 1 CF is not associated to M1. This 
means that failure in keeping proper look-out is highly related to a man factor 
(M1). 
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The CF most associated with improper look-out is M13-01: Focus of the seamen 
was distracted. There were 12 ships that were not focused on during look-out 
because there were several other things to do. For example, in a fishing area, 
there were many fishing vessels about, thus vessel A was perhaps focused on 
avoiding vessels C, D, etc., and did not realize vessel B was ahead. In another 
example, a fishing vessel was engaged in fishing activities and did not maintain 
a look-out. 
Improper look-out affecting several CFs in M1. The most affected CF from LRA 
is M11-03: careless seamen monitoring/identifying any risk of accident. If we 
look at CA, Table 5.1, this CF also has a high number of failure. Out of 23 
failures, 13 of them happen because of improper look-out. This makes sense 
because if seamen fail to maintain proper look-out in Stage 1 in the development 
of an accident, seamen will fail to identify any accident risk as well that happen 
in stage 2. Seamen will then fail to monitor the risk of accident. 
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Chapter 6  
Summary of the Analysis and 
Discussion 
The accidents have been re-analyzed by MOP model begin with corner analysis 
(CA) and closed by line relation analysis (LRA). The outcome of CA is causative 
factor (CF) list and LRA is causative chain list. From those lists, we can see what is 
the most common causative factors and causative chains happen lead to the 
accidents in four countries, Japan, United States (US), Australia, and United 
Kingdom (UK). The reason why only those four countries analyzed here because 
they represent each continent in the world except Africa. Author could not find any 
accident investigation report in Africa. 
In this chapter, author bring reader to understand the most common CF for each 
factor and the CC. In Man factor, there are two outstanding numbers of CF that 
occurred as the common cause of accidents, “Careless seaman in maintaining proper 
lookout” and “Careless seaman in monitoring/identifying any accident risk”, both 
CF are classified as “Careless Seaman”. In Machine factor, the most common CF is 
“Equipment failure: AIS/radar could not show information”, in Media factor is 
“Busy Traffic”, while in Management factor, “Poor management from onshore in 
identifying/ monitoring/ communicating any accident risk” become the most 
common CF that contribute in accidents. All of the most common CF will be 
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explained in the next section. 
6.1 Careless seaman in maintaining proper lookout (M101-02) 
This is the most common CF in analysis together with “careless seaman in 
monitoring/ identifying any accident risk” with the code M101-03. As seen on the 
Fig. 4.3 regarding the occurrence ratio (OR), the CF of M101-02 has the highest 
number of OR followed by M101-03. It means that, in terms of occurrence in each 
country, M101-02 is often happened except in the U.S. in terms of failures, M101-
03 with the failures of 62 which is bigger than M101-02with 60 failures. However, 
these two CFs are having outstanding number of failures compared with the other 
CFs. 
Maintaining proper lookout is very important task for bridge crew, as stated in “rule 
5 of COLREG: Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight 
and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing 
circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and risk 
of collision”. It is very understandable if there is a special rule regarding proper 
lookout, since if the officer not doing it well, accident will be regarded as a 
consequence. Maintaining proper lookout is one of difficult task on ship, the 
difficulty level increased when there are several limitations, such as visibility 
restriction, focus disruption by another thing, busy traffic, work time schedule of 
officer, etc. The failure in maintaining proper lookout is not a stand-alone failure, it 
is also affected by another activity. Thus, all bridge member should have a good 
team work to maintain proper lookout.   
6.2 Careless seaman in monitoring/identifying any accident risk (M101-
03) 
Compared to maintaining proper lookout, careless from seaman in monitoring/ 
identifying any accident risk is slightly different in term of responsibility. This CF 
is more to individual responsibility. It means that all the failures are based on 
59 
 
individual knowledge and ability. For example, the case of collision in narrow 
channel of river bank, the pilot who have advantage of knowledge and routine of the 
channel, should know how to pass the channel safely, but in fact it is often happened 
the pilot can not overcome the river`s hydrodynamics force or flood current. In 
another case, the pilot can overcome the forces, but can not take proper anticipation 
of his move and then accident happened.  
Actually, this CF can be overcome if the seafarer discuss or share their consideration 
in overcome the difficulties with another crew, so there are communication and 
knowledge exchange. Another big solution to overcome this CF is, keep on studying 
to increase the knowledge of safety rules and good seamanship. 
6.3 Equipment failure: AIS/ radar could not show information (M201-
01) 
This CF have close relationship with maintaining proper lookout AIS/ radar is 
included in “all available means appropriate” in need of doing proper look-out. Thus, 
the failure of this navigational aid can cause the accident. The main problem of the 
failure is the difference type of AIS class. Some problems that contribute to the 
failure are the difference type of AIS class among the ships, which result in AIS 
could not show information. Another problem is the failure of AIS/radar itself, so it 
could not give the information to seafarer. The knowledge and ability of seafarer in 
using AIS/ radar is the closest relation that contribute to the failure of this device. 
6.4 Busy traffic (M301-01) 
As commonly happened in road transportation, the busier traffic the bigger risk of 
accident. But, the risk in sea transport is bigger than road transport, as ships could 
not immediately stop if there are something wrong. This busy traffic can be 
experienced by seafarer in open sea where the area are commonly used by fishing 
vessel. Most of this condition are occurred in Japan and Australia. In US and UK, 
most of the accident occurred in river and this is also busy traffic. This CF can be 
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avoided by understanding the area, maintaining proper lookout and make good 
communication with VTS. The communication among seaman and pilot also 
important to reduce the risk of accident in busy traffic. 
6.5 Poor management from onshore in identifying/ monitoring/ 
communicating any risk accident (M405-01) 
The coordination between onboard crew and onshore management is very important 
thing to support the sea going activity going well. Good communication, good 
schedule of work of personnel, good practice of safety procedures and rules will 
support the seafarer to reduce the failure that caused accident. In analyzed 
investigation report, the lack of communication, bad personnel schedule of work, 
not applying the rule and practicing good Safety Management System are the CF 
that contributing in accident. Furthermore, the responsibility if ship maintenance 
also must be done well by the management, so seafarers can do their job on sea very 
well. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
MOP model has been established and developed. Several cases have been re-
analyzed using this new model, from the general cases until the specific purposes. 
The analysis that is provided in this dissertation is only collision cases even though 
previously author has published several papers analyzing other accident types. Here 
are 3 points that concluded the analysis: 
1. The dominant factor leading to collision is man factor (M1) 
In general man factor is still act as the main CF of accident, it is supported by 
the result of analyzed accident report shown the biggest number of failure in 
MOP model`s CA is on man factor. However, we see from the significant 
number of failure in each CF, these are the CF that all stakeholder need to 
consider to reduce the number of accident: 
In Man factor, there are two significant numbers of CF that occurred as the 
common cause of accidents, “Careless seaman in maintaining proper lookout” 
and “Careless seaman in monitoring/identifying any accident risk”, both CF are 
classified as “Careless Seaman”. In Machine factor, the most common CF is 
“Equipment failure: AIS/radar could not show information”, in Media factor is 
“Busy Traffic”, while in Management factor, “Poor management from onshore 
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in identifying/ monitoring/ communicating any accident risk”. 
2. MOP model is one of choice to analyze accident because of its flexibility 
Following the result of LRA in MOP model, it implies that MOP model still can be 
developed to get the maximum result of accident analysis model. Until this stage, 
The MOP model has 2 analysis steps, Corner Analysis (Ca) that produce Causative 
Factors (CFs) and Line Relation Analysis (LRA) that produce Causative Chains 
(CCs). CA provides what CF causing the accident, what CF were repeated, how 
many times those CFs occurred and what CF were significant causing the accident. 
Then LRA provides the connections, what CF are leading to, as well as the CF that 
occurred after, the repeated and/or significant CF, what CFs form CC and how many 
CC occurred. 
As the simple approach, this model can be utilized by organization/company to get 
the tendency how their accident occurred and modified based on their needs. This 
flexibility will be the benefit because the researcher can utilize this method started 
by generating the data needed. 
There are many interesting subjects to be researched related to accident in maritime 
transportation system utilizing this MOP model. Besides, for sure, this MOP model 
needs to be more developed by being utilized to many accident data, such as: 
1. Analyze more accident reports to get more reliable result, for example Canada. 
2. Develop a simple software that can help researcher analyze much more data that 
can generate the CF and CC lists automatically.  
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Appendix A 
Example of Analyzed Investigation Reports 
 
In this section, the detail steps utilizing MOP model is broken down, started from 
getting investigation reports until founding the causative chain lists. The source 
where all the investigation reports analyzed in this book is in references [12] and 
[13] for Japan, [14] for UK, [16] for ATSB and [17] for US. 
Only several parts of the analysis that represent all the procedures will be written 
here. For example, the first case was from Japan in 208. The investigation report is 
downloaded from this URL: http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/rep-
acci/2010/MA2010-5-1_2008tk0003.pdf 
The report is started from the general information about the accident as shown in 
Fig. A-1. The probable causes that were written in the report are: 
Vessel A had 2 pilots that did not have a clear job task between them and their 
communication was not good. Besides, Master of this vessel did not notice the 
existence of Vessel B and did not confirm to or receive any information from nearest 
coast guard (Kanmon) until vessel B is very near to vessel A. at the time Pilot 2 
realize the existence of vessel B, he thought that vessel B will pass ahead without 
confirming.  
In other hand, pilot of vessel B thought that vessel A will give way but between Pilot 
and Master did not share their thinking, then the communication was not good as 
well as among the vessels and Kanmon. The pilot chose wrong alteration to avoid 
the collision and the information that is inputted to the AIS was wrong, thus vessel 
A could not recognize the existence of vessel B earlier. 
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Fig. A-1 Page 1 in investigation report 
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Appendix B 
Corner Analysis 
Several probable causes are written by the investigators and experts in the 
investigation report. To see the characteristic of accidents, this first step of MOP 
model, corner analysis (CA), is done. It shows the causative factor list that led to 
accident, whether directly or indirectly. At first, after reading the report, all the 
failures are listed and categorize into 4M factor based on the definition in Table 3.3. 
In this section, the failures that led to accident in appendix A is traced for each 
involved ship in Table B-1. 
Table B-1. Failures led to collision case 1 
No. Ship Failures Stage 
1 A careless seaman in communication among the seamen (or with pilot)  1 
2 A careless seaman in understanding condition (wrong judgement/decision) 2 
3 A poor communication among onshore & other vessel utilizing radio 1 
4 A poor management of personal on board in distributing job tasks 1 
5 A poor management from onshore in identifying/monitoring/communicating 1 
6 B careless seaman in communication among the seamen (or with pilot) 1 
7 B careless seaman in understanding condition (wrong judgement/decision) 2 
8 B careless seaman in deciding course alteration 2 
9 B incapability of seaman/personnel in operating navigational equipment (unfamiliar) 1  
10 B poor communication among onshore & other vessel utilizing radio 1 
11 B poor management from onshore in identifying/monitoring/communicating 1 
 
To get the causative factor list, all the failures from 81 collisions and 129 ships 
involved are summarized, then categorized into several classifications, finally the 
code were set. The term of failures is changed into causative factor after they are 
summarized. Table B-2 gives the example how is the summary of Japanese collision. 
In Table B-2, 1A means collision number 1 and involved ship A, based on the report.  
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Table B-2. Summary example of failures in corner analysis or the list of causative factors for each 
ship in each case (Japanese collision- Man factor/ M1) 
Code Causative Factors 
1A 1B 2A 2B . . 20B Total 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 . . 1 2 3 Failures 
CARELESS SEAMAN             . .     
M101-01 
in communication among the seamen (or 
with pilot) 
o   o         . .    8 
M101-02 in maintaining proper lookout       o o  o   . .    25 
M101-03 in monitoring/identifying any accident risk        o  o   . .    23 
M101-04 
in understanding condition (wrong 
judgement/decision) 
 o   o   o   o  . .  o  12 
M101-05 in deciding speed             . .    10 
M101-06 in deciding course alteration     o        . .    9 
M101-07 
doing erratic/ineffective action in avoiding 
accident 
            . .    3 
M101-08 in flashing light signal             . .    1 
M101-09 in blasting sound signal       o      . .    2 
M101-10 in wearing/utilizing safety/survival devices             . .    2 
M101-11 in preventing flooding              . .    1 
M101-12 
in carrying out / following some 
procedures/ rules 
            . .    0 
INCAPABILITY OF SEAMAN/PERSONNEL             . .     
M102-01 
in operating navigational equipment 
(unfamiliar) 
   o      o   . .    4 
M102-02 in understanding signal from other vessels             . .    1 
M102-03 in controlling the operation             . .    0 
M102-04 
in arranging working procedure (mooring, 
berthing, towing)  
            . .    0 
M102-05 in performing crossing agreement             . .    0 
M102-06 
in executing commands from 
master/pilot/company rule 
            . .    0 
M103-01 focus of the seamen was distracted          o   . .    11 
SOME SEAMEN WERE NOT ON THE BRIDGE             . .     
M104-01 watch keeper was not on the bridge             . .    3 
M104-02 master was not on the bridge             . .    2 
HUMAN ELEMENT PROBLEM             . .     
M105-01 Fatigue             . .    1 
M105-02 Lethargy             . .    0 
M105-03 sleep inertia             . .    0 
M105-04 Stress             . .    0 
M105-05 Intoxication             . .    0 
M105-06 complacent attitude             . .    0 
 Total 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 3 0 4 1 0 . . 0 1 0 118 
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Appendix C 
Line Relation Analysis 
After getting the codes for each causative factor, the causative factor’s codes are 
arranged into causative chains based on what happen first, second, third, and so on 
from stage 1, 2 until 3. For example in case 1 (appendix A), the probable causes 
have been listed become causative factors and its code in corner analysis.  
The line relation analysis is begin by arranging the causative factors based on the 
order what happen first to the last, called as line relation by the codes. There are two 
line relations that was created in case 1. First is M403-06 > M101-01 > M101-04 
and second is M101-01 > M101-04 > M101-06. The CFs that perform line relation 
sometimes affecting and/or affected by other CF more than once or the reverse, some 
time there is CF that did not perform line relation. 
All the line relations from each country is collected and ordered. The same CFs are 
placed in the same column, then we can see the characteristics. For example, in case 
1, the order become: 
M403-06 >  M101-01 >  M101-04 
 M101-01 >  M101-04 >  M101-06 
 
After 20 cases of collision that happen in Japan are collected, the line relation term 
is changed into causative chain (as written in Table 4.5) 
